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Probate: Notice to Estate Creditors: the Effect of
Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope
On April 19, 1988, the United States Supreme Court ruled that estate
creditors should be afforded actual notice of probate proceedings. This decision will have a significant impact on probate procedure throughout the
country.
Before the decision in Tulsa ProfessionalCollection Services v. Pope,' most
states, including Oklahoma, employed short-term nonclaim statutes in probate proceedings. These nonclaim statutes worked to bar a creditor's claim
unless it was presented for payment to the executor of the estate. The time
limit imposed by the majority of the nonclaim statutes varied from two to
six months. These special statutes of limitation usually started running when
notice of the estate proceedings was first published in a local newspaper. The
policies for the use of such nonclaim statutes were two-fold. First, the statutes
were utilized to bar stale claims. Second, short term nonclaim statutes afforded repose to potential defendants. In other words, the beneficiaries of
the estate were given the peace of mind that the proceeding was final.
In 1950 the Supreme Court, in Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust,2
held that notice reasonably calculated to inform must be given for proceedings
to be accorded finality. Mullane also established a balancing test for courts
to use when deciding whether actual notice is appropriate.
Until Pope, no court had applied Mullane's principles to the probate setting. State courts distinguished Mullane by limiting its application only to
judicial proceedings. State courts concluded that actual notice did not make
estate creditors parties to a probate action, but simply notified them that they
could be if they desired. Therefore, no judicial decree extinguished a creditor's
property rights. Rather, the creditor's own inaction and the passage of time
barred the claim. This, of course, has changed with the recent decision in Pope.
This note will examine the evolution of notice provisions from their inception with Mullane, progressing through various state court decisions, and
culminating with Pope's application of the Mullane principles to the probate
arena. Of more acute importance, this note will further consider the effects
of Pope, and Oklahoma's legislative response to Pope, on the future administration of decedents' estates.
History of Notice Requirements Under Supreme Court Guidance
Mullane is the most important decision concerning the notice that parties
to an action must receive, establishing the standards by which notice provisions are judged. Mullane involved the sufficiency of notice to beneficiaries

1. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
2. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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of a common trust fund in regard to a judicial settlement of accounts. At
that time, under New York banking law, the only notice required to be given
to the beneficiary was publication notice in a local newspaper., This type of
notice was challenged for depriving beneficiaries of their due process rights.4
The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding that the due process clause
required that notice reasonably calculated to inform interested parties must
be given in any proceeding which is to be afforded finality.5
Mullane held publication notice to be insufficient because the beneficiaries
involved were known to the bank, and therefore, could have easily been
notified in a manner more likely to give actual notice.' The Court specifically
held that publication notice to known or reasonably ascertainable parties did
not satisfy due process requirements. 7 This ruling, however, did not extinguish
the constitutionality of publication notice in all cases. For example, when
parties are unknown and cannot be discovered through a diligent search
publication notice will suffice.'
The Mullane Court's balancing test determined the constitutionally required
form of notice 9 by balancing the interest of the state against an individual's
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.' 0 Advocating this balancing
test did not force the Court to commit itself to any standard formula for
determining adequate notice." Therefore, courts can make decisions on a case
by case basis.
Based on Mullane, more than publication notice will be required when an
individual's interest in receiving notice is greater than the interest a state may
have in requiring only publication notice. In Mullane, the Court held that
since the bank's proceeding might have deprived the beneficiaries of property
rights, the notice must comport with due process requirements.' 2 The Court
essentially found that the beneficiaries' interest in safeguarding their property
rights was greater than the state's interest in giving publication notice.
Recently, the rationale of Mullane was extended in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams.' 3 Mennonite involved an Indiana statute that provided
for an annual sale of real property on which taxes had been delinquent for

3. Id. at 309.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, stating, in relevant part, that: "No state shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
bf life, ibert, or property, without due process of law."
5. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
6. Id. at 315. In Mullane, the publication contained only the names and addresses of the

trust company, the name of the common trust fund and the date it was established, and a list
of the participating estates, trusts, and funds. The publication did not include the names of

the beneficiaries.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 317.
9. Id. at 313-14.
10. Id. at 314.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 313.
13. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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at least fifteen months. The statute required that, before the sale, the county
auditor had to both post and publish notice. Furthermore, the owner of the
property was to personally receive notice by mail. 4 However, the statute did
not require notice to be given to mortgagees of the property. The appellant
mortgagee claimed that it possessed a property interest in the real estate and
was therefore entitled to more than publication notice.
The Court, citing Mullane, held that the Mennonite Board of Missions had
been deprived of notice reasonably calculated to inform it of the pending sale.15
The Court held that because the Mennonite Board of Missions had a publicly
recorded, legally protected property interest publication notice was inadequate. 16 In essence, publication notice did not "satisfy the mandate of
Mullane."' 7
Though stating that Mennonite was controlled by Mullane,'1 the Court seemingly took Mullane one step further. Mennonite expanded Mullane in two
ways. First, Mennonite ruled that notice by mail or other means equally effective is the minimum constitutional requirement.1 9 This expands Mullane
because Mullane never specified the type of notice required. 20 Second,
Mennonite held that more than publication notice is required in a proceeding
which adversely affects the property interests of "any" party.2 By including
the word "any," the Mennonite Court effectively disposed of the Mullane
balancing test of state versus beneficiaries' interests.
The dissent in Mennonite noted these distinctions between Mullane and the
majority's opinion. 22 The dissent contended that the majority opinion
disregarded the Mullane mandate of focusing the analysis on the reasonableness
of the notice required by the state.23 The dissent also contended the majority
approach was too broad,24 and furthermore, not at all clear on the degree
of diligence required when ascertaining the names of affected parties.2"

14.
15.
16.
17.
that it

Id.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. By noting that the state did not satisfy Mullane's mandate the Court simply meant
was not duly diligent in attempting to locate the mortgagee's address.

18. Id.

19. Id. at 800.
20. Mullane did not go as far as to specify the type of notice that must be given. Rather,
Mullane simply noted:
The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey the required informa-

tion and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case
these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
21. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800.
22. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 801 (Dissent by O'Connor, Powell and Rehnquist).
23. Id.
24. The dissent contended that the majority opinion was too broad by holding that publication notice would never suffice when a property interest is involved. Id. at 803.
25. Id.
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Effect of Mullane on Probate Proceedings
Since Mullane, decided almost forty years ago, no state court has extended
the notice rationale to probate proceedings with regard to creditors. In fact,
courts have consistently distinguished Mullane upholding the constitutional
validity of publication notice to estate creditors. 26 In making the distinction,
courts have ruled that Mullane only applies when property rights are to be
affected by an adjudication proceeding, an element lacking in the probate
setting. 27
In Gano Farms,Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 28 a creditor of the estate whose
claim was barred by a nonclaim statute, contended that he was denied due
process because he was not given actual notice of the proceedings. This argument was based on the Mullane rationale. However, the Gano court held that
the doctrine expressed in Mullane was not applicable to probate proceedings.
In Mullane, receiving notice made the informed person an actual party to
the litigation. 29 However, notice under a nonclaim statute "does not make
a creditor a party to the proceeding, but merely notifies him that he may
become one if he wishes." 3 The Gano court rationalized that no judicial order
deprived the creditor of his property, but rather the statute of limitations had
run on its claim.' Gano has been cited by many state courts that have refused
to apply Mullane to probate proceedings. 2
In 1982, ContinentalInsurance Co. v. Moseley ("Moseley I")" marked the
beginning of a change in the notice requirements for probate proceedings.
In this case, creditors again claimed that publication notice to a decedent's
creditors was insufficient to meet due process requirements. In rejecting this
contention, the Nevada Supreme Court first considered the policy behind
nonclaim statutes.14 It held that the reason for nonclaim statutes in probate
proceedings was "to provide an expeditious and comparatively unencumbered
means of accomplishing estate administration."" The court next applied the
balancing test suggested by Mullane. 6 It balanced the interests of the heirs

26. For cases holding Mullane inapplicable in probate proceedings, see Brunell Leasing Corp.
v. Wilkins, 11 Ariz. App. 165, 462 P.2d 858 (1969); Gibbs v. Estate of Dolan, 146 111.App.
3d 203, 496 N.E.2d 1126 (1986); Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan. Ct. App. 2d
506, 582 P.2d 742 (1978); Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985);
New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1954); William B. Tanner
Co. v. Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981).
27. Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985).
28. 2 Kan. App. 2d 506, 582 P.2d 742 (1978).
29. Id. at 744.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985); William
B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981).
33. 98 Nev. 476, 653 P. 2d 158 (1982).
34. The particular non-claim statute in Moseley I provided that any claim which was not
filed within 60 days from the first publication of notice would be forever barred. Id. at 160.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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and beneficiaries in the speedy administration of the estate against the interest of the creditors in satisfying their claims. 37 The court in Moseley I concluded that based on all the circumstances, publication notice was "reasonably
38
and sufficiently calculated to provide actual notice to the creditor."
Moseley I was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In a memorandum opinion, the Court vacated and remanded the prior decision by the Nevada
Supreme Court.3 9 The Nevada Supreme Court was instructed to reconsider
the case in light of the then newly decided case of Mennonite Board of Missions
v. Adams.
On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision and
rendered a new decision in ContinentalInsurance Co. v. Moseley" ("Moseley
II"). In a short opinion, which simply cited passages from Mullane, Moseley
II became the first case requiring that creditors receive actual notice in probate proceedings. 4 '
Even though Moseley II was the first to require more than publication notice
to estate creditors, it was not persuasive in other jurisdictions addressing the
same issue. 42 Despite the clear language in Moseley II, state courts remained
steadfast in rejecting the need for more than publication notice to estate
creditors. For example, in Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 43 the
Missouri Supreme Court held the requirements of Mullane inapplicable to
probate proceedings." The nonclaim statute involved in Busch was deemed
of
to be a self-executing statute of limitations. 45 In other words, the passage
46
claim.
creditor's
the
extinguished
decree,
judicial
a
than
rather
time,
In Estate of Busch, the court held that the plaintiff-creditor relied upon
Moseley I147 as supporting the contention that a creditor's claim could not
be barred by a nonclaim statute unless more than publication notice was
given.4 8 However, the Missouri Supreme Court declined to follow the Nevada
rationale in Moseley 1I. Instead, the court noted that:
[t]he Supreme Court's procedure-granting certiorari, vacating and
remanding for further consideration in light of Mennonite ... does

37. Id,
38. Id. The fact that the court applied the Mullane balancing test is significant. In earlier
cases dealing with notice to creditors, the courts summarily dismissed the Mullane holding as
inapplicable to probate proceedings.
39. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983) (vacating and remanding 98 Nev.
476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982)).
40. 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984).
41. Id. at 21.
42. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Estate of Madden, 241 Kan. 414, 736 P.2d 940, 945 (1987);
Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86, 87 n.2 (Mo. 1985).
43. 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985).

44. Id.at 89.
45.
cess."
46.
47.
48.

A self-executing statute of limitations "operates independently of any adjudicatory proEstate of Busch, 700 S.W.2d at 89.
William B. Tanner v. Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 437, 302 N.W.2d 414, 420 (1981).
100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984).
Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985).
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not conclusively indicate that the Supreme Court has held, or will
hold, Mullane applicable in the circumstances of the remanded case.
We are not persuaded by the Nevada court's holding after con49
sidering the Mennonite case.
Therefore, Moseley II obviously was not going to persuade other courts
deciding the issue of notice appropriate for estate creditors. The majority of
state courts were still ruling that Mullane did not require more than publication notice under nonclaim statutes. The stubbornness shown in Estate of
Busch seemed to indicate that this view would remain until the United States
Supreme Court specifically ruled on the issue.
New and More Stringent Notice Requirement
Imposed Upon Estate Administrators
0 the United
In Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope,"
States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of the level of notice due estate creditors
in Oklahoma. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held
that due process required known or reasonably ascertainable creditors to receive
actual notice. This decision promises to have a tremendous effect on probate
procedure throughout the country. Before this decision, most states relied on
constructive notice to estate creditors, 5' however, this procedure must now
be modified in order to satisfy the mandates of Pope.
On April 2, 1979, H. Everett Pope died in Tulsa, Oklahoma, at St. John's
Hospital. His wife initiated probate proceedings and was later appointed administratrix of the decedent's estate. Although she complied with the requirements of the Oklahoma Probate Code regarding creditor notice, 2 the
appellant, a subsidiary of the hospital, failed to file its claim within the time
limit prescribed by the nonclaim provision."
The hospital creditor brought suit against the estate claiming that their due
process guaranties had been denied. After both the District Court of Tulsa
County and the Oklahoma Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's contentions, the case reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court where Mullane was held
inapplicable regarding notice to estate creditors. 5 4

49. Id. at 87 n.2.
50. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
51. Falender, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Notice is Due?, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 659 (1985).
52. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 331 (1981), amended by 58 OKLA. STAT. § 331 (Supp. 1989), requires
that the administrator give notice to creditors of the deceased immediately after their appointment.
53. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 333 (1981), amended by 58 OKLA. STAT. § 333 (Supp. 1989), requires
that the creditor file its claim with the administrator within 2 months from the date of first
publication.
54. In Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv. v. Pope, 733 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1986), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court was confronted with two issues. The first issue presented by the case was one of statutory
interpretation while the second issue involved the due process question. The first issue centered
on which of two statutes were applicable to the situation. In providing notice to creditors the
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Application of Mullane to Probate Proceedings
The rationale for requiring more than publication notice, as expressed by
the Supreme Court in Mullane, was essentially twofold." First, when the state
conducts a proceeding which could deprive an individual of property, that
individual must be afforded due process of law. Second, notice and the
opportunity to be heard are fundamental principles of due process. Therefore,
the primary issue discussed in Pope was whether the involvement of the probate court was substantial enough to be considered state action, thereby, invoking the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 Of course, the
Court first had to decide whether a creditor's unsecured claim was a property
interest and thus deserving of the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court did indeed determine that such claims were "property." Therefore,
the only significant issue remaining before the Court was whether to
characterize the nonclaim statute as a self-executing statute of limitation.
Differentiating Between Nonclaim Statutes
and Self-Executing Statutes of Limitation
The issue of whether there is a difference between nonclaim statutes and
statutes of limitations was of critical importance in Pope. A consideration
of the purposes of each indicates that there is a significant difference between
a nonclaim statute and a statute of limitation. The purpose of a statute of

personal representative relied on 58 Oma. STAT. § 331 (1981), amended by 58 OLA. STAT. § 331
(Supp. 1989), which requires that immediately after the personal representative is appointed he
is to publish notice to creditors in a county newspaper once a week for two consecutive weeks.
Id. The statute further provides that if the creditor failed to present his claim within the prescribed
time, the claim was forever barred. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 331 (1981), amended by 58 OKLA. STAT.
§ 331 (Supp. 1989). However, the hospital-creditor claimed that under 58 OKLA. STAT. § 594
(1953), their claim was exempt from the above mentioned non-claim statute. Pope, 733 P.2d
at 398. Section 594 provides that as soon as the personal representative has sufficient funds
he must pay the expenses of the decedent's last illness. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 594 (1954). The court
rejected this argument and held that the hospital-creditor was not exempt from the non-claim
statute. Pope, 733 P.2d at 399. In reaching its decision, the court cited Rogers v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 263 P.2d 409 (Okla. 1952). The court held that "in the construction of statutes,
harmony, not confusion, is to be sought." Pope, 733 P.2d at 399. To allow the claim to come
under section 594 would allow claims to exist outside of the time limit prescribed in section
331. Id. The court held that this would be contrary to the goal of expediting the administration
of estates. Id.
The court also considered the due process argument by the hospital-creditor. It should be
noted that the appellant did not raise the due process issue until they petitioned for a rehearing
after the Oklahoma court of appeals had affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the estate.
Pope, 733 P.2d at 399. The appellant claimed that without actual notice of the probate proceedings they were denied due process of law. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered,
but nonetheless, rejected this argument. The court essentially ruled that non-claim statutes did
not amount to adjudicatory proceedings. The court held that the passage of time rather than
an adjudicatory proceeding cut off the creditor's claim. Id. at 401.
55. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56. 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

limitation is twofold. First, statutes of limitation are utilized to "afford repose
to potential defendants." 7 This allows potential defendants to feel secure in
the knowledge that they are no longer subject to liability for their past actions. The second purpose of statutes of limitation is to "preclude the assertion of stale claims." 5 8
In State ex rel. Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital v. Reed, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court defined the purpose of nonclaim statutes in
Oklahoma.3 9 The court held that the "purpose of the nonclaim statute is to
facilitate the handling and closing of estates." ' 60 The court further noted that
the legislative intent behind such statutes was to expedite and quicken the
disposal of estate administrations. 6
As discussed previously, some courts upholding the validity of publication
notice in the probate setting have likened nonclaim statutes to statutes of limitation.62 The basic theory found throughout these decisions was that the nonclaim statute simply notifies creditors that, if they so wished, they could become
part of the estate administration.63 Gano held that the notice to creditors simply
"put into operation a special statute of limitation.' 64
In Pope, convincing the Court that nonclaim statutes were self-executing
statutes of limitation was critical to the estate's case. The estate contended
that in light of Texaco, Inc. v. Short,'6 the nonclaim statute in the Oklahoma
Probate Code was a self-executing statute of limitations, and therefore, due
process did not require actual notice to be given to potential claimants. Texaco
involved an Indiana Dormant Mineral Lapse Act 66 which extinguished mineral
rights left unused for more than twenty years. The interest in the mineral
rights left dormant would revert back to the surface owner unless the mineral
owner filed a claim with the county recorder's office. The appellants, whose

57. Falender, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Notice Is Due?, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 659, 676 (1985).
58. Id.
59. 493 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1972).
60. Id. at 818.
61. Id. See Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Estate of Madden, 241 Kan. 414, 736 P.2d 940 (1987)
(e.g., a primary purpose of non-claim statutes is the speedy settlement of estates); See also Buxton,
Does the Idaho Nonclaim Statute Violate Due ProcessNotice Requirements?, 24 IDAHO L. Rv.
465, 465 (1988) (e.g., "the general thrust of the nonclaim statute is to quickly and efficiently
wrap up ... the decedent's estate"); Smith, Known Estate CreditorsandNotice by Publication:
A Due ProcessIssue is Resolved in Florida,61 FLA. B.J. 71 (1987) (noting that nonclaim statutes
facilitate the speedy settlement of estates).
62. See, e.g., Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Estate of Madden, 241 Kan. 414, 736 P.2d 940,
946 (1987); Gano Farms, Inc. v. Kleweno, 2 Kan. Ct. App. 2d. 506, 582 P.2d 742, 744 (1978);
Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. 1985); William B. Tanner
Co. v. Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414, 420 (1981).
63. Gano Farms, Inc., 582 P.2d at 744.
64. Id.
65. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
66. IND. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 through 32-5-11-8 (1976).
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mineral rights had reverted under the Act, contended that due process re67
quired that they receive actual notice before being deprived of their property.
In rendering its decision, the Texaco Court noted the distinction between
a self-executing statute of limitation and a judicial determination that a lapse
of some sort had occurred.68 A self-executing statute of limitation requires
no state action to begin the running of the statute. When state action is present,
actual notice is constitutionally required.69 A self-executing statute of limitation does not have to satisfy the requirements set forth by Mullane.70 Mullane
is only "applicable to a judicial proceeding
brought to determine whether
'7
a lapse ... did or did not occur." '
As mentioned, in Pope the estate attempted to persuade the Court that
the nonclaim statute was only a statute of limitations, and therefore, publication notice would pass constitutional muster. However, the Court ruled that
by appointing an estate administrator the probate court's involvement rose
to state action and therefore, the nonclaim statute was no longer selfexecuting. 7" If the state is involved in any way beyond enacting the statute,
73
the self-executing characterization is nullified.
The Court held that significant state action existed in Oklahoma probate
proceedings.74 In Oklahoma, the probate court was found to have a significant role in the administration of estates. The determinative factor for the
Supreme Court's finding of state action was that the Oklahoma probate court
appointed administrators and then directed them to immediately publish notice
to creditors. 7 The Court held that the involvement of the probate court
throughout the proceedings was so "pervasive and substantial" that state action must be found, thereby invoking the due process clause of the fourteenth
76
amendment.
Further, the Court rejected the argument that creditors in estate proceedings
were not made parties to actions by receiving notice, but instead simply informed of their potential involvement. 77 The Court also noted a property interest could be adversely affected even if the proceeding did not address the
78
claim on its merits.
67. Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 522.
68. Id. at 534.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Id.
72. 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.at 1345-46.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 1346.
78. Id.In providing this rule the Court cited Mullane. The Court noted that the proceedings
in that case did not address the merits of the mortgagees claim. Nevertheless, in Mullane due
process required actual notice be given. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1958). However, it could be argued that the claim found in Mullane and the claim
in Pope can be distinguished. In Pope, a creditor's claim could be completely untenable, but
nevertheless would, under the ruling of the Court, deserve actual notice.
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Application of the Mullane Balancing Test
Whenever a court must decide the type of notice required, it must first
balance the interest of the state against the interest of the individual who is
seeking enforcement of his due process rights. 7 In Pope, the Court balanced
the interest of the creditors to receive payment of their debt, against the interest of the state to expedite the administration of estates.8 0 When balancing
these interests, the Pope Court reasoned that creditors are less likely to benefit
from publication notice,8" while at the same time the estate's interests in shortterm, nonclaim statutes suffers little by refusing to give estate creditors actual
82
notice.
Based on this balancing test, the Pope Court suggested that mailed notice
would be an efficient and inexpensive way of providing notice to known
creditors. Accordingly, known and reasonably ascertainable creditors must
now be given actual notice. 3 Those creditors who are not reasonably ascertainable need only be given publication notice. However, the Court failed
to expressly define who is considered a known or reasonably ascertainable
creditor. It only provided that a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor
is one who could be located through reasonably diligent efforts. When stating
that reasonably diligent efforts must be used, the Court cited Mennonite. 4
However, the Mennonite decision does not provide much guidance to the estate
executor who is attempting to comport with the mandates of Pope.
Mennonite involved a mortgagee who did not receive notice of a pending
tax sale. The Court merely stated that extraordinary efforts were not required
to locate an interested party and suggested that public records be checked
when searching for such parties." The Mennonite opinion provides no further guidance. Therefore, even after Pope, it is not clear how far a personal
representative must go when locating possible estate creditors. Some commentators, in anticipation of the constitutional problems of published notice in

79. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1958).
80. 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347 (1988). In Pope, the Court once again utilized the balancing test
which was enunciated in Mullane. The court in Mennonite departed from this balancing test.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
81. "Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small
type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315,
82. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
83. Id.
84. It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor, who wrote the Pope decision, dissented
in Mennonite, stating that the decision to require reasonably diligent efforts in locating mortgagees was not clear. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 791. In Mennonite, Justice O'Connor stated that
the majority decision failed to define what a reasonably diligent effort entails. Id. However,
in writing for the majority in Pope, Justice O'Connor cites to the Mennonite majority in holding
that reasonably diligent efforts are required when locating estate creditors. Pope, 108 S. Ct.
at 1347. Interestingly, Pope does not provide any further guidance as to what is necessary in
locating creditors. It seems as though Justice O'Connor is espousing exactly what she criticized
in Mennonite.
85. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798 n.4.
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probate, have suggested various steps which should be taken by the personal

representative when locating creditors. 86 The suggestions include searching

public records, the decedent's mail, his personal records, and inquiring into

the knowledge of family and business associates. However, even though these
suggestions provide guidelines, it remains unclear how extensive the search

must be.
Such mandate, which sets a subjective standard of "reasonably diligent ef-

forts" when searching for creditors, will result in an increase in litigation.
Whenever a creditor finds that his claim has been barred from an estate proceeding, it is likely that the creditor will bring suit against the estate, claiming
that the personal representative was not duly diligent in his search for creditors.
Because there are no objective standards as to what constitutes a duly diligent
search, suits by creditors could easily become increasingly burdensome in probate proceedings.
Oklahoma's Response to Pope

In response to the ruling in Pope, the Oklahoma legislature recently amended
many of the provisions in the probate code dealing with notice to estate

legislature
creditors. Following the Supreme Court's suggestion, the Oklahoma
7
revised the code to provide mailed notice to estate creditors.

Title 58, section 331 of the Oklahoma Statutes has been significantly changed
since Pope." Before Pope, this section provided that immediately after ap-

pointment the executor of the estate was to provide published notice to estate
creditors. The notice was to be published in any newspaper in the county
once each week for two consecutive weeks. Furthermore, under the old statute

86. See Borron, Due Process of Law and the Sufficiency of Published Notice of Letters
Granted, 7 PROB. L.J. 61, 69-70 (1985); Buxton, Does the Idaho Nonclaim Statute Violate Due
Process Notice Requirements?, 24 IDAHo L. REv. 466, 484 (1988); Falender, Notice to Creditors
in EstateProceedings: What Processis Due?, 63 N.C.L. Rav. 660, 695 (1985); Kuether, Is Kansas
Probate Non Claim Statute Unconstitutional?, 54 J. KAN. B.A. 115, 125 (1985).
87. The amendments to the Oklahoma Probate Code were approved June 22, 1988. The new
amendments will be applied to estates in which probate is commenced on or after November
1, 1988. See 58 OKiLA. STAT. § 331.1 (Supp. 1989).
88. Section 331 provides, in pertinent part:
Every personal representative must, unless the notice has been given by a special
administrator as provided in Section 215 of this title, within two (2) months after
the issuance of his letters, file notice to the creditors of the decedent stating that
claims against said deceased will be forever barred unless presented to such personal representative ... by the presentment date stated in the notice. The presentment date shall be a date certain which is at least two (2) months following the
date said notice is filed, and the first publication of said notice shall appear on
The notice to creditors
or before the tenth day after the filing of said notice ....
shall be given by publication in some newspaper in the county in which the probate
is filed once each week for two (2) consecutive weeks and by mail to all known
creditors of the decedent at their respective last-known available addresses.
58 OiaA. STAT. § 331 (Supp. 1988).
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the creditor had only two months from the date of first publication to file
his claim with the executor. 9
The amended statute is significantly different. Under the new statute the
personal representative has two months from the issuance of his letters to
file notice to creditors.90 This added time is imperative due to the added responsibility of locating the creditors who are due mailed notice.9 1 In addition to
mailed notice, section 331 still requires the personal representative provide
creditors with published notice.92
The notice detailed in section 331 is defined further in section 331.2.9 This
section provides that the notice to creditors shall be given by regular first
class mail. 9 The section also provides that personal delivery by the personal
representative or his attorney would also be sufficient."
The Oklahoma legislature codified a new section to the probate code, section 331.1, which attempts to define known creditors." This section provides
two definitions of a known creditor. A "known" creditor is one which is
"actually known" to the personal representative or reasonably ascertainable
by the personal representative.' 7 The newly codified section defines a
"reasonably ascertainable" creditor as one whose last known address and
claims can be determined by a reasonably diligent search of the decedent's
personal effects."
Although the language of this section regarding known creditors and due
diligence is more specific than that found in Pope,9' the language remains
deficient. First, the statute considers the actual knowledge of the personal
representative to determine a creditor's status. Due to this language, more
creditors would conceivably be within the actual knowledge of the executor

89. 58 OKI.A. STAT. § 331, amended by 58 OKLA. STAT. § 331 (Supp. 1989).
90. 58 OKiA. STAT. § 331 (Supp. 1989).
91. Obviously, the executor has added responsibilities under the new statute. The old statute
simply required the executor to provide published notice. However, the new amended statutes
require the executor to conduct a search for specific creditors and provide each with notice.
92. This satisfies the mandate in Pope that unknown creditors may still be afforded only
publication notice. See Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
93. 58 OKIA. STAT. § 331.2 (Supp. 1989).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Section 331.1 provides, in relevant part:
As used in this act, 'known creditors' . . . shall mean those creditors of the decedent actually known to the personal representative or reasonably ascertainable by
the personal representative as of the date notice to creditors is filed. 'Reasonably
ascertainable creditors' shall be those whose identities, last-known addresses and
claims can be determined by reasonably diligent efforts of the personal representative. If reasonable under the circumstances, such efforts shall include the personal representative's conducting a search after the decedent's death and prior to
the filing of the notice to creditors, of the personal effects of the decedent.
58 OKLA. STAT. § 331.1 (Supp. 1989).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
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if the executor had a close relationship with the decedent. Whereas, if the
executor knew nothing of the decedent's affairs, some creditors could possibly
be avoided.' °0 Accordingly, estates with administrators who did not have a
close relationship with the decedent would be in an advantageous position.
Furthermore, the consideration of the administrator's knowledge may lead
to burdensome litigation, further inhibiting the speedy administration of estates.
Another problem with section 331.1 is the definition of "reasonably diligent
efforts." The language in this section states that the administrator's "efforts
shall include ... a search ... of the personal effects of the decedent.'""
This section remains unclear on whether anything else is required in order
to satisfy the due diligence requirement, and could certainly lead to wasteful
litigation.
The new legislation also increases the involvement of the probate court.
The legislation requires that various affidavits be filed with the probate court.
For example, section 331.1 requires an affidavit to be filed which attests that
the executor employed due diligence in attempting to identify creditors.'0 2 Also,
section 332 now requires an affidavit to be filed which lists the names and
03
addresses of all known creditors who were sent first class mailed notice.'
Finally, due to a newly codified section, the judge must "conduct an inquiry
to judicially determine whether the personal representative has complied with
the provisions . . . of this act."' 0 4

100. The situation could arise where a creditor is actually known to the executor but would
not otherwise be reasonably ascertainable. In this situation, the estate benefits by the appoint-

ment of the administrator who did not have a close relationship with the decedent.
101. 58 OKrA. STAT. § 331.1 (Supp. 1989).
102. The filing of the affidavit provided for in section 332 of Title 58 of the Oklahoma Statutes
shall constitute an affirmation by the personal representative that reasonably diligent efforts have
been made by the personal representative to determine the identities, last-known addresses and

claims of the decedent's creditors in accordance with this section. Id.
103. Section 332 provides:
After notice is given as required by section 331 of this title and affidavit of mailing

and, if applicable, of personal deliveryind an affidavit of publication must be
filed with the district court clerk. The affidavit of mailing, and if applicable, of
personal delivery shall be made by the personal representative and shall state words
to the effect that the personal representative personally, or by and through the
personal representative's attorney mailed notice by first-class mail to all creditors

of the decedent known to the personal representative on the date said notice was
filed with the district court for the county in which probate is pending. Said affidavit shall also state the identities and last-known addresses of such creditors
and the date said notice was mailed or delivered.
58 OKLA.

STAT.

§ 332 (Supp. 1988).

STAT. § 632.3 (Supp. 1989) provides, in relevant part:
1. At the hearing on the final account of any personal representative who has given
notice to creditors as provided in this title, the judge shall conduct an inquiry
to judicially determine whether the personal representative has complied with
the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of this act.

104. 58 OKLA.

2. The final decree shall contain a finding in substantially the following form: that

notice to creditors as required by Section 3 and 4 of this act was given by the
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This legislation greatly expands the personal representative's duties as well
as the duties and involvement of the probate court in Oklahoma estate administration. Due to the increased duties of both the personal representative
and the probate court, it is questionable whether the goals of the nonclaim
statute are still intact. The new legislation seems to be too cumbersome and
time consuming to effectuate the goal of speedy estate administration.
One Possible Alternative to the Oklahoma Legislation
The approach taken by the Oklahoma legislature was one way to satisfy
the mandates of Pope. However, there is another possible alternative. When
addressing the issue of notice rights of estate creditors, the Supreme Court
in Pope only ruled on the constitutionality of short-term, nonclaim statutes.
The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of long-term, nonclaim statutes.
These statutes begin running at the decedent's death and provide a longer
period in which to file a claim with the decedent's estate. 05 Before Pope,
most states' 6 included such statutes in conjunction with short-term, nonclaim
statutes.0 7 Therefore, even after Pope, long-term, nonclaim statutes which
begin to run at the decedent's death remain constitutionally intact.
The alternative to the cumbersome and time consuming approach enacted
by the Oklahoma legislature would be to only utilize a long-term, nonclaim
statute in probate proceedings. If the statute comported with the mandates
of Texaco, Inc. v. Short,"'8 it would be classified as a statute of limitation.
Based on the holding in Texaco, a nonclaim provision which begins to run
at the time of the decedent's death, rather than at the time the court appoints
an administrator, may be constitutionally valid even without giving notice to
creditors. If the time limit of the nonclaim provision begins at the decedent's
death, with no involvement of the probate court, the statute may be held
to be a self-executing statute of limitations.

personal representative, including notice by mail to all creditors ... at their
respective last-known addresses; and that all claims not filed within the time
permitted for the presentation of claims are nonsuited, void and forever barred
3. A final decree which fails to contain the finding required by this section be
voidable.
105. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1346. (Court stating "[w]e also have no occasion to consider the
proper characterization of nonclaim statutes that run for the date of death, and which generally
provide for longer time periods, ranging from I to 5 years.").
106. For a listing of states with long term nonclaim statutes, see Falender, Notice to Creditors
in Estate Proceedings: What Notice is Due?, 63 N.C.L. REv. 659, 668 n.39 (1985). Oklahoma
does not have the type of long-term nonclaim statute as is noted in this article. 58 OKLA. STAT.
§ 331 (Supp. 1989), provides that if the decedent has been dead for more than 5 years before
the commencement of probate proceedings, the creditors only have one month from the date
of notice in which to file their claim.
107. Falender, supra note 106, at 668-69.
108. 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (if a statute is deemed self-executing, due process does not require
notice to be given).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/7

1989]

NOTES

At least one commentator has suggested that long-term, nonclaim statutes
should pass constitutional muster so long as they possess the characteristics
of statutes of limitation.' 9 Long term statutes are similar to statutes of limitations in many ways."' Long-term, nonclaim statutes and statutes of limitation have two critical similarities. First, no state action is involved with the
running of long-term, nonclaim statutes.' 1 These statutes begin running with
the death of the decedent. Secondly, long-term, nonclaim provisions possess
the two characteristics of all statutes of limitation. Such statutes afford repose
to potential defendants and bar the assertion of stale claims." 2
However, a problem may exist with this alternative. In order to pass a constitutional challenge such a provision may need to be classified as a long-term
statute. The typical long-term, nonclaim statutes involve a time span of one
year or more, after the death of the decedent, for creditors to file claims.
Therefore, by utilizing a long-term, nonclaim statute the goal of expediting
estate administration may be inhibited. However, it appears a better alternative than the cumbersome approach which was taken by the Oklahoma
legislature.
Conclusion
The extension of Mullane to probate proceedings in regard to estate creditors
was a long awaited, but inevitable step. Because of the extension in Pope,
dramatic changes will occur in the administration of estates. In Oklahoma,
for example, the legislature has recently amended the probate code to reflect
the mandates of Pope. The new notice provisions require that estate creditors
be provided with actual notice of the proceedings. This will undoubtedly result
in an increase in the number of claims made against estates. The decision
in Pope and the resulting legislation should be considered a victory for estate
creditors. However, the new legislation is very cumbersome and time consuming. The legislation has added dramatically to the duties of both the personal representative and the probate court. The new mandates by the legislature
have effectively done away with the ability to conduct a simple and expeditious
resolution of estate administration.
Nicole Losacco

109. Falender, supra note 106, at 677.
110. Id. at 676.
111. Id. at 676-77.
112. Id. at 677. Long-term nonclaim statutes are said to bar the assertion of stale claims because
of their length. In Pope, the appellant attacked the characterization of short-term, nonclaim
statutes as statutes of limitation by arguing that, due to their short length, they do not have the
purpose of barring stale claims. The heart of this argument was that claims do not become stale
after two months; therefore, the short-term nonclaim statute does not meet the definitional requirements of a statute of limitation. Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Tulsa Professional Serv. v.
Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
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